PHP checks Content-Length against post_max_size before parsing multipart
bodies, but Transfer-Encoding: chunked requests have no Content-Length.
The full chunked body is processed without any size check, allowing the
exploit to send 140MB+ to exhaust memory_limit=128M despite post_max_size=8M.
This removes the last non-default configuration requirement. The exploit
now achieves full RCE against stock php:*-apache Docker images with zero
configuration changes (4/4 confirmed on php:8.4.26-apache).
Changes:
- post() auto-switches to chunked TE for bodies over 8MB
- Default --huge-mb raised from 12 to 140 (exceeds stock 128M limit)
- README rewritten to document the working three-stage RCE chain
- docker-compose.yml adds stock variant for testing